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ARTICLE

CassandraBurke Robertson
Personal Jurisdiction in Legal Malpractice Litigation

Abstract.
Lawyers are increasingly engaging in multi-jurisdictional
practice-and their representation is increasingly giving rise to crossjurisdictional malpractice actions. Over the years, courts have issued
divergent and contradictory opinions about whether out-of-state attorneys
representing clients only on out-of-state matters can constitutionally be
subject to personal jurisdiction in the client's home state. The Supreme
Court's recent opinions in Daimler v. Bauman and Walden v. Fiore do little to
settle this question and, in fact, may raise more questions than they answer.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court's new personal jurisdiction jurisprudence
offers an opportunity for courts to adopt a more cohesive analysis of personal
jurisdiction in legal malpractice cases.
In particular, the Supreme Court has left room for courts to consider the
state's interest in regulating legal practice and protecting state citizens as part
of their personal jurisdiction analysis. To ensure that such interests are not
neglected, courts should focus on two aspects of the specific jurisdiction
analysis. First, they should permit a broader view of "connectedness" in
specific jurisdiction cases, upholding jurisdiction when the defendant's forum
conduct is similar to the conduct at issue in the suit-even if defendant's inforum contacts did not directly cause the plaintiffs harm. Second, courts
should consider the foreseeable in-state effects of the attorney's out-of-state
conduct. If competent representation would give rise to foreseeable in-state
issues and consequences, the attorney has engaged in purposeful availment of
forum benefits by accepting the engagement. Both of these recommendations
are consistent with existing Supreme Court precedent, and both would
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promote a more consistent approach to personal jurisdiction while protecting
client interests.
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INTRODUCTION

Legal representation increasingly crosses state-and even nationalboundaries.' A revolution in communication technology has made it
easier for lawyers to represent geographically distant clients. 2
Solo
practitioners may work primarily, or even exclusively, online,
communicating with clients through video conferences and email.3 Large
law firms, on the other hand, may aspire to international status-their
offices span the globe, and their attorneys travel wherever needed to
represent clients across the United States and throughout the world.
An increasingly global legal practice means that client disputes, when
they arise, are also more likely to cross geographical and jurisdictional lines.
Understandably, clients will find it easier to file legal malpractice actions in
their home forum than to travel to the attorney's location to bring a
lawsuit. But will courts in the client's home forum have personal
jurisdiction over non-resident attorneys? Certainly, in some cases the
answer will be easy-if, for example, an attorney lives near the border of
two states, is licensed in both, regularly practices in the courts of both
states, and represented the client within the courts of the client's home
state, then there is no question that the attorney would be subject to
jurisdiction in that state.' Eliminate any of these facts, however, and the
question becomes more difficult: What if the lawyer is licensed in the
client's home state but did no work there for the client?' What if the
lawyer represented the client only on an out-of-state matter-but could
reasonably foresee that the client would feel the effects of that
representation in its home state?' What if the lawyer represented a client
only on an out-of-state matter but advertised within the client's home
state?' For decades, courts have struggled to apply consistent principles in

1. See Cassandra Burke Robertson, Regulating Electnic Legal Support Across State and National
Boundaries, 47 AKRON L. REv. 37, 39 (2014) ("[The globalization of business practices means that
legal services can cross borders much more easily.").
2. See id. ("[A] growing number of lawyers are providing legal services online th[r]ough virtual
law practices.").
3. See John Walbillich, Legal Tech: The Rise of the Virtual Lanyers, WIREDGC (Feb. 25, 2011),
http://www.wiredgc.com/2011/02/25/legal-tech-the-rise-of-the-virtual-lawyers ("[V]irtual law firm
means two things ... the judicious use of technology to work and communicate with clients and coworkers.'.
4. See infra Part III.
5. See infra Part III.A.
6. See infra Part IV.B.
7. See infra Part III.B.
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determining whether non-resident attorneys could be subject to personal
jurisdiction in such instances.8
In 2014, the Supreme Court decided two major personal jurisdiction
cases: Daimler AG v. Bauman9 and Walden v. Fiore."o Both of these cases
proved to be immediately influential in substantially shifting the
equilibrium for personal jurisdiction." Daimler significantly narrowed the
application of general (dispute-blind) jurisdiction, holding that a party's
"systematic and continuous" contacts alone are not enough to support
jurisdiction unrelated to the forum.'" Instead, it applied an "at-home" test
to support general jurisdiction only where a corporate defendant was
incorporated or had its principal place of business." Walden limited the
scope of "effects-based" jurisdiction, holding that a defendant's mere
knowledge that a plaintiff will suffer negative effects in a given forum is
likewise insufficient to support jurisdiction." Walden required a showing
that the defendant's intentional contacts connected it with the forum state,
"not just to a plaintiff who lived there."' 5
This Article analyzes the various factors affecting the jurisdictional
question in litigation against non-resident attorneys. First, it explains the
doctrine, history, and intent of the constitutional personal jurisdiction
doctrine and explores how that doctrine was changed by the Daimler and
Walden decisions." Second, this Article examines the various positions
taken by courts prior to the Supreme Court's decisions in Daimler and
Walden and offers predictions about how the recent decisions are likely to
8. See general# 4 RONALD E. MALLEN WITH ALLISON MARTIN RHODES, LEGAL
MALPRACTICE § 37:20 (2015 ed.) ("If a legal malpractice action is filed in the state other than where
the attorney resides, the initial question is whether there is a basis for personal jurisdiction.");
Marjorie A. Shields, Annotation, In Personam Jursdidtion, Under Long-Arm Statute, over Nonresident
Attorney in Lega/MaoraticeAtion,78 A.L.R. 6th 151 (2015) (collecting and categorizing cases).

9. Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014).
10. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014).
11. See Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes & Cassandra Burke Robertson, Toward a New Equilibrium in

PersonalJurisdition,48 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 207, 263-64 (2014) (discussing the impact of Daimlerand
Walden on current and future personal jurisdictional doctrine).

12. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 761-62.
13. Id.
14. See Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1126 (explaining jurisdictional principles and stating "the mere fact
that his conduct affected plaintiffs with connection to the forum State does not suffice to authorize
jurisdiction").
15. See id. (discussing precedent and holding jurisdiction cannot be asserted in the forum state
based solely on actions that are connected to a plaintiff who lives there); id. at 1123 ("To be sure, a
defendant's contacts with the forum State may be intertwined with his transactions or interactions
with the plaintiff or other parties. But a defendant's relationship with a plaintiff or third party,
standing alone, is an insufficient basis for jurisdiction.").
16. See infra Part II.
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affect jurisdictional determinations in legal malpractice cases.' Finally, it
proposes a balanced framework for jurisdictional analysis that builds on
the Supreme Court's recent decisions but also incorporates state regulatory
interests in client protection.'" This framework will ensure the liberty
interests protected by the constitutional due process doctrine will remain
intact, but it will also ensure that courts may exercise jurisdiction over nonresident attorneys when the attorneys' conduct falls within the state's
legislative and regulatory power.
11.

THE SHIFTING EQUILIBRIUM IN PERSONALJURISDICTION

Within the last four years, the Supreme Court has significantly changed
the personal jurisdiction analysis." After going for many years without
deciding a single personal jurisdiction case, it suddenly decided four
cases-and, in each of them, held the exercise of personal jurisdiction
would infringe on the defendant's constitutional right to due process. 2 o
This retrenchment of judicial power has a significant impact on the scope
of litigation and will continue to have far-reaching effects.
A.

The History and Purpose of ConstitutionalPersonalJurisdiction

Personal jurisdiction refers to a court's authority to exercise jurisdiction
over the parties to the case. Historically, courts exercised power over
individuals within their territorial jurisdiction.21 As transportation and
commerce developed, however, disputes increasingly began to cross state
lines. States developed so-called "long-arm" statutes that enumerated
situations in which local courts could assert jurisdiction over both business
17. See infra Part III.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See Bernadette Bollas Genetin, The Supreme Court's New Approach to Personaljurisdiction, 68
SMU L. REv. 107, 107-08 (2015) (discussing the impact of precedent on the Supreme Court's
decision).
20. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762 (2014) ("It was therefore error for the
Ninth Circuit to conclude that Daimler ... was at home in California, and hence subject to suit there
on claims by foreign plaintiffs having nothing to do with anything that occurred or had its principal
impact in California.'); Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1124-26 ("[We conclude that petitioner lacks the
'minimal contacts' with Nevada that are prerequisite to the exercise of jurisdiction over him.');
Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, SA v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011) (finding a lack of
"continuous and systematic" contacts sufficient for the North Carolina court to assert jurisdiction
over the foreign corporation); J. McIntyre Mach., Ltd. v. Nicastro, 131 S. Ct. 2780, 2791 (2011)
(reversing the New Jersey Supreme Court's decision and holding New Jersey's "exercise of
jurisdiction would violate due process").
21. See Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, Libey, Substantive Due Process, and PersonalJurisdcion, 82
TUL. L. REv. 567, 572 (2007) ("Under the common law, only those physically present within the state
could be served.").
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entities and individuals who were not domiciled within the state.2 2 As
these statutes grew in number and reach, courts were asked to define the
outer limits of the state's power to authorize such jurisdiction. In 1878,
the Supreme Court decided Pennqyer v. Neff," holding that the Due Process
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment limited the power of states to
exercise jurisdiction over out-of-state defendants.2
Over the next century and a half, the Court has repeatedly reaffirmed
the existence of constitutional limits on personal jurisdiction. Over that
time, however, the Court's focus has shifted: in 1878, the Court in Pennoyer
was focused on territorial sovereignty. 2" By the middle of the century, in
InternationalShoe Co. v. Washington,2 6 the Court's focus had shifted from
sovereignty to fairness, emphasizing that jurisdictional determinations
should incorporate notions of "fair play and substantial justice."27 Later
cases seemed to vacillate between bright-line rules of territorial power28
and more flexible standards that deferred to individualized decisions of
reasonableness. 29 Scholars have noted disagreements about whether the
"core value" of the personal jurisdiction doctrine is the protection of the
defendant's liberty interests, procedural fairness and the avoidance of
undue burdens on unwilling litigants, or the limits of sovereign power;3 0 at
22. Id. at 572-73 (discussing how states began to enact long-arm statutes, which allow courts to
assert jurisdiction over nonresidents).

23.
24.
25.
26.

Pennoyer v. Neff, 95 U.S. 714 (1878).
Id. at 733.
Id.
Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310 (1945).

27. The Court in InternationalShoe Co. noted:
Historically the jurisdiction of courts to render judgment in personam is grounded on their de
facto power over the defendant's person. Hence his presence within the territorial jurisdiction
of a court was prerequisite to its rendition of a judgment personally binding him. But
now. . . due process requires only that ... he have certain minimum contacts with it such that
the maintenance of the suit does not offend 'traditional notions of fair play and substantial

justice.
Id. at 316.
28. E.g., Burnham v. Superior Court of Cal., 495 U.S. 604, 621-22 (1990) (upholding transient
jurisdiction due to its long pedigree).

29. E.g., Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478 (1985) ("j]urisdictional rules may not be
employed in such a way as to make litigation 'so gravely difficult and inconvenient' that a party
unfairly is at a 'severe disadvantage' in comparison to his opponent." (quoting The Bremen v. Zapata

Off-Shore Co., 407 U.S. 1, 18 (1972))).
30. See Austen L. Parrish, Sovereignty, Not Due Process: PersonalJurisdiction over Nonresident Aen
Defendants, 41 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 1, 54 (2006) (arguing that, at least in transnational cases
involving foreign defendants, sovereignty is the only basis for constitutional restrictions on personal
jurisdiction); Rhodes, supra note 21, at 569 ("Some commentators urge that jurisdiction's core value is
procedural fairness, while others claim that sovereignty is the guiding principle."); Alan M. Trammell,
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different times, the Supreme Court has expressed support for all three
views. 3 1

B.

The DoctrinalBases of the JurisdictionalAnalsis

The varying-and sometimes competing-interests that courts sought
to protect through personal jurisdiction have led to the development of a
Under the Supreme Court's current
relatively complicated doctrine.
doctrinal formulation, there are two types of personal jurisdiction: general
and specific. General jurisdiction is dispute-blind, allowing a defendant to
be sued on any matter, whether or not it related to activity within the
forum. Courts' application of general jurisdiction has undergone a radical
For decades, the common
transformation over the last two years.
interpretation of Supreme Court precedent provided that general
jurisdiction would be appropriate when the defendant had "continuous
and systematic" contacts within the forum.3 2 just how substantial those
contacts had to be was hotly debated-some courts interpreted relatively
sparse contacts over a longer time period to count as sufficiently
continuous and systematic, while others did not.3 3
All of this changed in 2014 when the Supreme Court decided Daimler
AG v. Bauman, which abandoned the "continuous and systematic" test in
JuiisdiclonalSequenang, 47

GA. L. REV. 1099, 1123 (2013) ("[P]ersonal jurisdiction derives from the

Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and protects a person's liberty
interests.').

31. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 754-55 (2014) (noting "InternationalShoe's
conception of 'fair play and substantial justice"' constituted a "momentous departure from Pennoyer's

rigidly territorial focus"); Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1122 (2014) ("Due process limits on the
State's adjudicative authority principally protect the liberty of the nonresident defendant-not the
convenience of plaintiffs or third parties." (citing World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444

U.S. 286, 291-92 (1980))); Ins. Corp. of Ireland v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694,
702 (1982) ("The personal jurisdiction requirement recognizes and protects an individual liberty
interest. It represents a restriction on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of

individual liberty."). Additionally, the Court in World-Wide Volkswagen noted:
[TJhe Framers also intended that the States retain ... in particular, the sovereign power to try
causes in their courts. The sovereignty of each State, in turn, implied a limitation on the
sovereignty of all of its sister States-a limitation express or implicit in both the original scheme
of the Constitution and the Fourteenth Amendment.
World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980).
32. See Judy M. Cornett & Michael H. Hoffheimer, Good-Bye Signticant Contacts: General Personal

JutrisdictionAfter Daimler AG v. Bauman, 76 OHIO ST. L.J. 101, 104-05 (2015) ("The law was so well
settled that large corporations in leading cases did not even challenge general jurisdiction over them."

(citing Bauman v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 644 F.3d 909, 914 (9th Cir. 2011))).
33. See Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, C/anfying GeneralJurisdiction, 34 SETON HALL L. REV. 807,
811 (2004) (offering an empirical review of approximately 3,000 cases and finding significant
variation among the standards employed by various courts).
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favor of one that allowed for dispute-blind jurisdiction only where the
defendant is "at home."" The Court further held that at-home status will
normally correlate with domicile and citizenship: for individuals, generally
their state of residence, and for corporations, both their state of
incorporation and the state, if different, in which they maintain their
principal place of business." In theory, the general jurisdiction analysis
should now be simpler, as it relies on a more bright-line rule. In practice,
however, any simplification in general jurisdiction is likely to be offset by a
growth in disputes over specific jurisdiction.3 6
In contrast to general jurisdiction, specific jurisdiction is not disputeblind-instead, it requires that the dispute bears a relationship to the
judicial forum and gives rise to a determination of judicial power that
applies only to the case at bar. The Supreme Court has held that specific
jurisdiction requires a multipart analysis. First, the defendants must have
purposeful "minimum contacts" with the forum state. The Court has
characterized this requirement as one of "purposeful availment"-that is,
the defendant's contacts cannot merely be fortuitous, accidental, or solely
the result of the plaintiff's actions but must demonstrate that in some way
the defendant sought to benefit from interactions with forum state.3
Second, there must be some relationship between the defendant's
purposeful contacts with the state and the dispute itself." Finally, the
34. Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 762.
35. See Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 11, at 218 (explaining the Supreme Court in Daimler
"gave a decisive answer: except in very rare circumstances, a corporation is 'at home' only where it is
domiciled-its state of incorporation and the state where it maintains its principal place of
business'.
36. See id. at 211 (predicting an increase in specific-jurisdiction disputes).
37. See Henry S. Noyes, The PersistentPblem of PuposefulAvailment, 45 CONN. L. REv. 41, 51-52
(2012) (examining the history and development of the "purposeful availment" requirement). The
Court in Burger King defined the scope of "purposeful availment":
This "purposeful availment" requirement ensures that a defendant will not be haled into a
jurisdiction solely as a result of "random," "fortuitous," or "attenuated" contacts ... or of the
"unilateral activity of another party or a third person"....
Jurisdiction is proper, however,
where the contacts proximately result from actions by the defendant himsef that create a
"substantial connection" with the forum State.

Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 478 (1985) (citations omitted).
38. See Daimler, 134 S. Ct. at 754 (defining specific jurisdiction as litigation that "aris[es] out of
or relate[s] to the defendant's contacts with the forum" (alteration in original) (quoting Helicopteros

Nacionales de Colom., SA v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 414 n.8 (1984))); Burger King, 471 U.S. at 472
(supporting jurisdiction when "litigation results from alleged injuries that 'arise out of or relate to'
[defendants] activities" in the forum (quoting Helicopteros de Nacionales de Colom., SA v. Hall, 466

U.S. 408, 414 (1984))); Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945) (applying to obligations that
"arise out of or are connected with the activities within the state"); see also Rhodes & Robertson, supra
note 11, at 230-31 (explaining the connectedness requirement of personal jurisdiction).
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Court must be satisfied that the exercise of jurisdiction is reasonable under
the circumstances-and for that determination, it must weigh five factors,
sometimes called the "fairness" or "reasonableness" factors, which
include: (1) "the forum state's interest in adjudicating the dispute"; (2) "the
plaintiff's interest in obtaining convenient and effective relief"; (3) "the
interstate judicial system's interest in obtaining the most efficient
resolution of controversies"; and (4) "the shared interest of the several
states in furthering fundamental substantive social policies.""
Because specific jurisdiction relies on a more flexible standard, there is
significant room for the parties to contest jurisdiction. Parties may dispute
whether the defendant's contacts with the forum were truly purposeful,
the extent of the connection between the dispute and the defendant's
contacts with the forum, and finally, whether it would be reasonable for
the trial court to exercise jurisdiction over the defendant, given the relative
benefits and burdens.
Shortly after limiting the reach of general jurisdiction in Daimler, the
Supreme Court decided a second 2014 case, Walden v. Fiore, this time
addressing a variant of specific jurisdiction.4 0 Walden evaluated the first
part of the specific jurisdiction analysis-that is, what kind of contacts can
establish purposeful availment of forum benefits. 4 ' The Supreme Court,
which has long held that contacts must be measured by the defendant's
actions, not those of a plaintiff or other third party, stated three decades
ago that "[t]his 'purposeful availment' requirement ensures that a
defendant will not be haled into a jurisdiction solely as a result of 'random,'
'fortuitous,' or 'attenuated' contacts, or of the 'unilateral activity of another
party or a third person."'42 That is, a plaintiff's unilateral forum contacts
cannot give rise to jurisdiction-the defendant itself must take some
affirmative action to "create a 'substantial connection' with the forum
state."4 3
Thus, for example, the Court held in Hanson v. Denckla4 4 that a trust
company whose long-term client moved out of state could not be sued in
the plaintiffs new state-although the company had engaged in
39. World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 292 (1980).
40. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1126 (2014).
41. See id. at 1121 ("This case addresses the 'minimum contacts' necessary to create specific

jurisdiction.').
42. Burger KIng, 471 U.S. at 475 (citations omitted) (first quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine,

Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984); and then quoting Helicopteros de Nacionales de Colom., SA v. Hall,
466 U.S. 408, 417 (1984).
43. Id. at 475.
44. Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235 (1958).
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communications with the client in her new state, this was a result of her
unilateral move; the trust company had done nothing to "purposefully
avail] itself of the privilege of conducting activities within the forum
State." 4 ' The Court contrasted its decision with McGee v. InternationalLife
Insurance Co.,`6 which had similarly attenuated facts but one key difference:
in McGee, the insurance company defendant had solicited the plaintiffs
continuing business by mailing a policy-renewal offer to his home.4 It
was a small difference, but an important one. The Court emphasized the
"territorial limitations" of the states forbade them from exercising
jurisdiction without such purposeful contact."8
Walden addressed the question of whether out-of-state conduct with an
in-state effect could count as the requisite purposeful availment."
Decades earlier, in Calder v. Jones,so the Court had appeared to establish a
broad authorization for such jurisdiction; it allowed a defamation plaintiff
to sue in her home state of California for statements made by a writer and
editor in Florida, holding the writer and editor "directed" their tortious
conduct at the state by discussing the plaintiffs California activities and by
causing reputational harm in that state." In the years following the
Supreme Court's decision in Calder, lower courts disagreed about how the
case should be interpreted." A number of courts applied Calder's holding
broadly, stating that "intentional conduct knowingly targeting a forum
resident" would count as conduct that "targeted" the plaintiffs home
forum.5 3

Other courts applied a more restrictive test, deciding that the

defendant's conduct must have a stronger connection with the forum
itself.5

45.
46.
47.
48.
49.

4

Id. at 253.
McGee v. Int'l Life Ins. Co., 355 U.S. 220 (1957).
Id. at 221-22.
Hanson, 357 U.S. at 250-51.
Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1119 (2014) (recognizing the issue of the defendant's out-

of-state conduct on an in-state plaintiff).

50. Calder v. Jones, 465 U.S. 783 (1984).
51. Id. at 788-89.
52. See Alan M. Trammell & Derek E. Bambauer, PersonalJurisdiction and the ¶Interwebs," 100
CORNELL L. REV. 1129, 1144 (2015) (explaining that "nearly identical facts led to contrary
conclusions in different courts").
53. Lee Goldman, From Calder to Walden and Beyond. The ProperApplication ofthe "Effects Test" in

PersonalJurisdictionCases, 52 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 357, 359 (2015) (first citing Wash. Shoe Co. v. A-Z
Sporting Goods Inc., 704 F.3d 668, 675 (9th Cit. 2012); then citing Licciardello v. Lovelady, 544 F.3d
1280, 1288 (11th Cir. 2008); and then citing N. Laminate Sales, Inc. v. Davis, 403 F.3d 14, 26 (1st Cit.
2005)).
54. Id. (first citing Wolstenholme v. Bartels, 511 Fed. App'x 215, 219 (3d Cit. 2013); then citing
Grynberg v. Ivanhoe Energy Inc., 490 Fed. App'x 86, 97 (10th Cir. 2012); then citing Mobile
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In Walden, the Supreme Court adopted a restrictive view of the "effects
test," concluding the "targeting" requirement was not satisfied by the
allegedly wrongful seizure of funds from a forum resident." The case
arose when a Georgia-based law enforcement officer seized gambling
winnings from a Nevada resident traveling through Atlanta. 5 6 The
plaintiff sought to file suit in her home state of Nevada, but the Court
concluded that jurisdiction was lacking." It emphasized that the correct
jurisdictional standard is "whether the defendant's actions connect him to
the forum," underscoring both "defendant" and "forum" to distinguish
situations in which it is the plaintiff's actions that connect the suit to the
forum and situations in which the defendant's actions create only a
connection to the plaintiff, not an action to the forum itself." In Walden,
the Court concluded the defendant's actions were insufficient to establish
jurisdiction." Because the effects of the financial deprivation would be
felt wherever the plaintiff chose to reside, nothing in the defendant's
seizure of funds created the requisite connection to the forum.6 0 By
treating in-forum effects as just another type of contact the defendant
might have with the relevant forum, the Court made clear that effectsbased jurisdiction is not an alternative basis for jurisdiction; instead, it falls
squarely within ordinary specific jurisdiction, and must therefore be
subject to the same minimum-contacts analysis.6 1
Although the Supreme Court suggested in Walden that it was merely
distinguishing its earlier decision in Calder, Walden can be better interpreted
as a "stealth overruling" of the Court's earlier opinion.6 1 In Calder, the
writer and the editor who were sued for defamation had not had direct
Anesthesiologists Chi., LLC v. Anesthesia Assocs. of Hous. Metroplex, PA, 623 F.3d 440, 445-46
(7th Cir. 2010); then citing Clemens v. McNamee, 615 F.3d 374, 379 (5th Cir. 2010); then citing
Johnson v. Arden, 614 F.3d 785, 796 (8th Cir. 2010); and then citing Young v. New Haven Advocate,
315 F.3d 256, 262-63 (4th Cir. 2002)).
55. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1125 (2014).
56. Id. at 1119.
57. Id.
58. Id. at 1124.
59. Id.
60. Id at 1125.
61. Id. at 1126.
62. This argument has been put forth previously:
The facts that the Court excludes from its discussion of Calder, however, suggest that the Court
is going much further, such that Walden is a "stealth overruling" of Calder-if a new case were to
arise today with the exact same fact pattern as Calder, it is unlikely that the Court would sustain
jurisdiction.
Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 11, at 253.
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contact with the plaintiffs home forum. Instead, they communicated the
allegedly defamatory statements to their employer (the NationalEnquirer)in
Florida, and their employer subsequently published the statements
throughout the nation. 6' The Supreme Court was careful to explain that it
was not imputing the publication's forum contacts to the writer and the
editor; thus, "the Enquirer's California sales were not counted as minimum
contacts in the case against the individual defendants."6 4 Instead, the
Court relied on the "foreseeable effects of that communication on the
plaintiffs reputation in California, rather than the publication in
California," to establish effects-based jurisdiction.6 s In contrast, the Court
in Walden held that even though the plaintiff would foreseeably suffer
effects in her home forum, those effects were insufficient to establish
jurisdiction.
It may be possible to distinguish the two cases by concluding that libel,
as a reputational tort, may target the plaintiffs home forum (and
reputational center) in a way that funds deprivation does not.16

If this is

the basis for a distinction, however, neither case will be particularly useful
outside its own factual context. Courts will continue to struggle with
effects test cases that arise in other contexts, such as intellectual property
infringement, financial fraud, business torts, and-importantly for this
Article-legal malpractice.6 " Thus, while the stronger view is that Calder
and Walden are "rather squarely at odds,"' 8 the tension between the two
cases is less important than the uncertainty raised by the Court's opinion in
Walden: If causing foreseeable harm to an in-state resident is insufficient to
show that the defendant "targeted" a forum, then what is left of the effects
test outside of the libel context? After all, even the most minor direct
contact with a forum (such as the solicitation in McGee) may support
traditional minimum-contacts jurisdiction; effects test jurisdiction was only
ever relevant in cases where the defendant lacked even the most minor
direct contact with the forum.

63. Id.
64. Id. (quoting Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Inextricable Meits Problem in PersonalJutisdiction,

45 U.C. DAvIS L. REV. 1301,1313 (2012)).
65. Id.
66. Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1123-24 ('The crux of Calderwas that the reputation-based 'effects' of
the alleged libel connected the defendants to California, not just to the plaintiff.").
67. See Allan Erbsen, Persona/jurisdictionBased on the Local Effects of Intentional Misconduct, 57 WM.
& MARY L. REV. 385, 416 (2015) ('That confusion is a problem because terrorism, computer
hacking, and myriad other forms of intentional torts lack the idiosyncratic nuances of libel law.").
68. Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 11, at 253.

PersonalJurisdictionin LegalMa/practiceLiligation

2016]
III.

15

PERSONALJURISDICTION OVER NON-RESIDENT ATTORNEYS

The doctrinal shift in personal jurisdiction creates new challenges in
legal malpractice litigation. Certainly, some cases will not change. Both
before and after Daimler and Walden, attorneys and law firms could always

be sued in their home states, regardless of where the representation
occurred or the matters it covered." But for non-resident attorneys, the
situation has always been complicated-and has become even more so
now.
A.

Generaljurisdicion

General jurisdiction over attorneys and law firms will become more
difficult to obtain. The prior pervasiveness of the "continuous and
systematic" standard meant that out-of-state law firms that regularly
represented in-state clients-and certainly those that maintained an instate office-did not even challenge jurisdiction when they were sued in
the client's home forum.70 Attorneys and firms with lesser contacts, who
represented in-state clients only occasionally, would sometimes have to
litigate the question of whether those actions were enough to meet the
continuous and systematic test, though courts were generally reluctant to
subject defendant attorneys to dispute-blind jurisdiction for such sporadic
representation.n
Now that the continuous and systematic standard is dead, cases that
previously seemed certain will be litigated; even businesses with an in-state

69. See Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014) (summarizing general jurisdiction for
individuals and corporations in their home forum); Walden, 134 S. Ct. at 1122-23 (2014) (clarifying it
is the defendant's affiliation with the state that creates personal jurisdiction); 4 MALLEN WITH
RHODES, supranote 8, § 37:20 (emphasizing jurisdiction can be found in the state the lawyer resides,
even if the claim arises elsewhere).
70. See, e.g., Jackson v. Kincaid, 122 S.W.3d 440, 450 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 2003, pet.
granted, judgm't vacated w.r.m.) ('We note that the trial court retains personal jurisdiction over
Crowe & Dunlevy, which apparently conceded that its substantial legal representation of Texas
clients subjects it to general personal jurisdiction here."); see also 4 MALLEN WITH RHODES, su'pranote
8, § 37:24 (stating a "basis for general jurisdiction exists, if the lawyer or law firm maintains a place of
business or has regular contacts within the forum jurisdiction").
71. See, e.g., Cerberus Partners, LP v. Gadsby & Hannah, LLP, 836 A.2d 1113, 1119 (R.I. 2003)
(holding that the law firm's contacts were not significant enough to give rise to general jurisdiction;
ten attorneys had been admitted to Rhode Island pro hac vice in six different cases between 1994 and
2003). For further discussion, see generally Kowalski v. Doherty, Wallace, Pillsbury & Murphy, 787 F.2d 7
(1st Cir. 1986), King v. Ridenour, 749 F. Supp. 2d 648 (E.D. Mich. 2010), Klayman v. Barmak, 634 F.
Supp. 2d 56 (D.D.C. 2009), Cape v. von Maur, 932 F. Supp. 124 (D. Md. 1996), ExparteDill, Dill, Carr,
Stonbraker & Hutchings, PC, 866 So. 2d 519 (Ala. 2003), and 4 MALLEN WITH RHODES, supra note 8,
§ 37:24.
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regional office can contest general jurisdiction." There is no longer any
need for courts to determine how many clients a lawyer or firm must
represent before becoming subject to general jurisdiction-even
continuous and systematic client representation will not give rise to general
jurisdiction. Instead, the attorney or law firm must meet the "at-home"
test. In most cases, this is a bright-line test: the Supreme Court concluded
that it should correlate with domicile and citizenship in all but the most
"exceptional" circumstances." In Daimler, this standard meant that even a
regional office located within the state was insufficient to render the
corporate defendant at home; only the state of incorporation or principal
place of business would qualify as the home forum." This standard will
similarly apply to multi-office law firms that, in the past, would have been
subject to general jurisdiction in any state where the firm maintained an
office. Now, however, general jurisdiction over a firm will likely be limited
to its state of incorporation (or registration, if the firm is founded as a
non-corporate entity") and the state, if different, where the "nerve
center" of the firm is located.
But even as courts are freed from the burden of determining the
necessary quantum of contacts to support general jurisdiction, other
questions will arise. One such question, which was not answered by
Daimler, is whether an attorney is at home in a state where he or she
maintains an active law license. Under the prior continuous and systematic
test, courts often held that merely holding a state license was not the type
of regular contact needed to support general jurisdiction.7 7 Under the

72. The Daimler defendant, after all, had a regional office located in California. Daimler, 134 S.

Ct. at 752.
73. Id. at 746, 761 n.20 (2014) ("We do not foreclose the possibility that in an exceptional case
a corporation's operations in a forum other than its formal place of incorporation or principal place
of business may be so substantial and of such a nature as to render the corporation at home in that

[s]tate." (citing Perkins v. Benguet Consol. Mining Co., 342 U.S. 437 (1952) (second citation
omitted))).

74. Id. at 752 ("MBUSA has multiple California-based facilities, including a regional office in
Costa Mesa, a Vehicle Preparation Center in Carson, and a Classic Center in Irvine.').
75. Although the Court in Daimler spoke of "incorporation," the defendant in the case,
Mercedes-Benz USA, LLC, was actually a limited liability company. Id at 761-62; see also 5 JOHN P.
LENICH, NEBRASKA PRACTICE SERIES: NEBRASKA CIVIL PROCEDURE § 3:8 (Thomson West 2015)
("The next question is whether corporations and unincorporated entities are subject to general
personal jurisdiction in the same places. The Court's decision in Daimler suggests that the answer is
'yes."').

76. See Hertz Corp. v. Friend, 559 U.S. 77, 91-92 (2010) (defining "principal place of
business').

77. See Worthington v. Small, 46 F. Supp. 2d 1126, 1134 (D. Kan. 1999) ("In short, other than
maintaining his Kansas law license, defendant has had very few contacts with Kansas in recent years.
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new at-home test, however, should the acquisition of a license to practice
law render the attorney at home in the forum? A state license, after all,
permits the attorney to practice without restriction in the courts of the
state, and licensure provides a basis to support that state's judicial authority
to regulate the attorney's practice.7
Few attorneys will maintain active
licenses in more than two states.7 9 In cases relating to the attorney's
provision of legal services, it is possible that the state of licensure may be a
close analogue to the state of incorporation or principal place of business
that forms the basis of at-home jurisdiction for corporations and similar
business entities. 80
B.

SpecficJurisdiction

Although there are still some remaining uncertainties about the scope of
general jurisdiction, there are many more open questions about the scope
of specific jurisdiction. Even before the Supreme Court's recent personal
jurisdiction decisions, the flexibility of the specific jurisdiction standard

These limited contacts are not sufficiently 'continuous and systematic' to enable this court to exercise

general jurisdiction over defendant."); Santos v. Sacks, 697 F. Supp. 275, 281 (E.D. La. 1988) ("It is
this Court's opinion that membership in the Florida Bar does not, of itself, establish the minimum
contacts required by due process to confer personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant.");

Crea v. Busby, 55 Cal. Rptr. 2d 513, 515 (Ct. App. 1996) ("The only contact respondent has had with
California is the maintenance of his California law license. He has not practiced law in California in
14 years. He does not maintain an office, solicit clients, advertise, own property, or have obligations

in California."). But see Nikolai v. Strate, 922 S.W.2d 229, 239 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1996, writ
denied) ("[W]e conclude that requiring Tondre, a licensed Texas attorney actively practicing in Texas
courts, to submit to the jurisdiction of Texas courts does not offend traditional notions of fair play
and substantial justice.").
78. Beth M. Coleman, Note, The Constitutionaity of CoupuLoy Attorney Service: The Void Left ly

Mallard, 68 N.C. L. REV. 575, 586 n.1 13 (1990) ("[A]ttorneys receive reciprocal benefits as a result of
state licensure."). "State licensure in essence grants attorneys a monopoly in the practice of law." Id.
79. See Jenny Montgomery & Rebecca Berfanger, Attorneys Discuss Pros and Cons ofPracticingin 2
States, THE IND. LAW. (Apr. 13, 2011), http://www.theindianalawyer.com/
attorneys-discuss-pros-and-cons-of-practicing-in-2-states/PARAMS/article/26113 (noting multiple
state licensure creates significant burdens on attorneys, including CLE requirements and payment of
bar dues).
80. The Restatement (Third) of Law Governing Lawyers refers to the lawyer's state of licensure
as the lawyer's "home state," in summarizing the breadth of advice an attorney may provide to instate clients. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF LAW GOVERNING LAWYERS 5 3 cmt. e (AM. LAW INST.
2000) ("[A] lawyer conducting activities in the lawyer's home state may advise a client about the law
of another state, a proceeding in another state, or a transaction there, including conducting research
in the law of the other state, advising the client about the application of that law, and drafting legal
documents intended to have legal effect there."). In contrast, a resident lawyer not licensed in the
state where he or she resides would run the risk of liability for unauthorized practice of law. Lawyers
may only practice law in jurisdictions in which they have been admitted or licensed. Pamela A.

McManus, Have Law License; Will Travel, 15 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 527, 528-29 (2002).

18

ST. MARY'S

JOURNAL ON LEGAL MALPRACICE &ETHICs

[Vol. 6:2

created room for courts to reach different conclusions after weighing the
relevant factors."
In particular, individual facts and particularized
circumstances can lead to a difference in how the fairness factors are
weighed: the degree of the attorney's contacts with the forum, the degree
to which the attorney sought in-state business, and the nature of the legal
representation all play into courts' analyses of the jurisdictional question.8 2
Courts will typically find jurisdiction in claims arising from cases in
which out-of-state lawyers represent clients in the courts of the forum
state." In such a case, the lawyer will clearly have in-state contacts that
give rise to the claim asserted, and because the attorney has already
appeared in an in-state matter, the reasonableness factors are likely to
weigh in favor of finding jurisdiction.8 4 Some states may place additional
limits on personal jurisdiction that go beyond the requirements of
constitutional due process, but in the absence of such external limits or
other unusual circumstances, courts will typically find jurisdiction over an
attorney who has made an in-state appearance in the underlying matter.8 5
A more difficult question arises when the out-of-state attorney
Such attorneys
represents in-state clients in out-of-state matters.8 6
typically have some in-state contacts-they may mail letters to in-state
clients, they may visit the clients in the home forum, and they may have
81. See generally Shields, supra note 8, at 151 (collecting cases and reporting varying outcomes).

82. Id.
83. For example, the Court in Wilds v. Semmes, Bowen & Semmes noted:
It is clear to the Court that subjecting this defendant to suit in Virginia on those causes of
action which arose from defendant's activity as plaintiffs legal counsel in Virginia clearly falls
within the perimeters of due process. Defendant certainly availed itself of the privilege of
conducting activities within the forum state and directly invoked the benefits and protection of
its laws.

Willis v. Semmes, Bowen & Semmes, 441 F. Supp. 1235, 1244 (E.D. Va. 1977); see also Alonso v.
Line, 2002-2644, p. 10 (La. 5/20/03); 846 So. 2d 745, 752 (La. 2003) (noting the Alabama attorney
had appeared in a Louisiana court hearing); Turner v. Tranakos, 744 P.2d 898, 899 (Mont. 1987)
(upholding jurisdiction when an attorney made an in-state appearance as attorney of record).

84. See, e.g., Alonso, 846 So. 2d at 752 ("[W]hile line testified that it is somewhat difficult to
travel in that he is a large man with knee problems and cannot travel by car to Louisiana, we find that
Aftcr all, Line
this burden is not so difficult as to overcome presumption of reasonableness.
previously traveled to Baton Rouge by plane to appear in court.:).
85. See generaly Bryant v. Weintraub, Genshlea, Hardy, Erich & Brown, 42 F.3d 1398, No. 94-

35313, 1994 WL 650140 (9th Cir. Oct. 11, 1994) (unpublished table decision) (noting the lawyer
represented the plaintiff in related actions in California and Oregon but interpreting Oregon's longarm statute to provide for jurisdiction only if the attorney's in-forum actions directly caused plaintiff's
harm, and finding the California action caused the relevant harm in this case).

86. See general# Newsome v. Gallacher, 722 F.3d 1257 (10th Cir. 2013) (evaluating various
aspects of jurisdiction to determine whether the lower court had specific jurisdiction over an out-ofstate attorney).
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engaged in varying levels of in-state advertising or other businessdevelopment activities." In 2013, the Tenth Circuit struggled with this
question in Newsome v. Gallacher,8 8 a case that arose when a bankruptcy
trustee filed a legal malpractice action in Oklahoma, alleging a Canadian
law firm and its attorneys negligently represented the bankrupt Oklahomabased corporation." The court catalogued similar cases and noted a split
among courts at both state and federal levels, with some willing to exercise
jurisdiction based on the representation of in-state clients and others
unwilling to do so.9 o Based on its assessment of five cases against" and

three cases in favor,9 2 the court concluded that the "majority view" was
that "an out-of-state attorney working from out-of-state on an out-of-state
matter does not purposefully avail himself of the client's home forum's
laws and privileges, at least not without some evidence that the attorney
reached out to the client's home forum to solicit the client's business.""
Because the Canadian law firm worked only from Canada and only "on
transactions consummated in Canada," the court held Oklahoma lacked
personal jurisdiction over the firm.9 4 The court acknowledged that the
firm did have some Oklahoma contacts related to the representationnotably, it had facilitated the placement of liens on Oklahoma propertybut concluded the Oklahoma contacts were not sufficiently related to the
alleged malpractice to be able to support jurisdiction.9 s
Given the fact-bound nature of the specific jurisdiction determination
and the relatively balanced number of supporting cases it cited on either
side, the Tenth Circuit may have overstated whether there was a true
"majority view" on personal jurisdiction over a non-resident attorney hired
to assist with out-of-state needs. Nevertheless, even in the short time
87. See id. at 1280 (referencing "the normal communications that make up an active attorneyclient relationship").

88. Id. at 1257.
89. See id. at 1262 (noting the debtor-corporation was owned by Canadians, incorporated in
Delaware, and operated exclusively in Oklahoma).
90. See id. at 1280 ("Courts are split regarding whether out-of-state legal work on an out-ofstate matter can subject an out-of-state lawyer to personal jurisdiction in the client's home forum.").

91. Sawtelle v. Farrell, 70 F.3d 1381, 1391-94 (1st Cir. 1995); Sher v. Johnson, 911 F.2d 1357,
1363 (9th Cit. 1990); Austad Co. v. Pennie & Edmonds, 823 F.2d 223, 226-27 (8th Cir. 1987);
Exponential Biotherapies, Inc. v. Houthoff Buruma N.V., 638 F. Supp. 2d 1, 7-9 (D.D.C. 2009);
We're Talkin' Mardi Gras, LLC v. Davis, 192 F. Supp. 2d 635, 636-41 (E.D. La. 2002).
92. Keefe v. Kirschenbaum & Kirschenbaum, PC, 40 P.3d 1267, 1272-73 (Colo. 2002); Brown
v. Watson, 255 Cal. Rptr. 507, 512-13 (Ct. App. 1989); Cardidge v. Hernandez, 9 S.W.3d 341, 344
(Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
93. Newsome, 722 F.3d at 1280-81.
94. Id. at 1281.
95. Id.
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since it was decided, the case has been influential: its statement of the
"majority view" has been quoted in seven additional cases within a twoyear period-though most were from federal district courts within the
Tenth Circuit and therefore bound by its holding.1 6 Even if the Newsome
court's position was not clearly the majority view at the time it was
decided, it appears to have become the majority view now.9 7
Furthermore, because the case was decided as a matter of constitutional
due process, lower courts have acknowledged that they are obligated to
follow it-even when it conflicts with decisions from the relevant state's
highest court."
Even under Newsome's restrictive view of jurisdiction, however, it is
possible to distinguish cases based on each case's particular factual context.
Most importantly, the court's qualification that the rule may not apply
when "the attorney reached out to the client's home forum to solicit the
client's business" has been seized as a compelling exception-though with
some variation.9 9 One court chose to analyze the question of who
initiated the representation, concluding that the exception would not apply
where the client had sought out the lawyer, rather than vice versa.'o
Another court applied the exception more broadly, deciding that the
lawyer's efforts to maintain a normal attorney-client relationship sufficed
to show the attorney had "reached out" to the client's home forum,
regardless of who first sought to initiate the relationship. 0 1
96. Domain Vault LLC v. Bush, No. 14-CV-2621-WJM-CBS, 2015 WL 1598099, at *5 (D.
Colo. Apr. 8, 2015); Hutton & Hutton, LLC v. Girardi & Keese, No. 13-1462-DDC-KGS, 2015 WL
1470515, at *7 (D. Kan. Mar. 31, 2015); Reynolds v. Henderson & Lyman, No. 13-CV-03283-LTB,
2014 WL 5262174, at *3 (D. Colo. Oct. 14,2014); Chun Chee Seng v. Americana Invs., LLC, No. 13CV-01745-REB-KMT, 2014 WL 4099322, at *6 (D. Colo. Aug. 20, 2014); CVR Energy, Inc. v.
Wachtell, Upton, Rosen & Katz, No. 13-2547-JAR-TJJ, 2014 WL 4059761, at *5 (D. Kan. Aug. 14,
2014); Jee v. Super. Ct., No. A140360, 2014 WL 1048198, at *3 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 19, 2014);
Fulbright & Jaworski v. Eighth Jud. Dist. Ct., 342 P.3d 997, 1004 (Nev. 2015).
97. Outside the Tenth Circuit, some courts continue to allow jurisdiction under similar

circumstances. See Beverage v. Pullman & Comley, LLC, 316 P.3d 590, 590 (Ariz. 2014) (affirming
the court of appeals' analysis conferring Arizona jurisdiction over defendants); Ward v. Hawkins, 418

S.W.3d 815, 821 (Tex. App.-Dallas 2013, no pet.) (concluding the record established minimum
contacts for the state of Kansas to confer personal jurisdiction).

98. See Reynolds, 2014 WL 5262174, at *4 ("I am bound by Newsomes holding regarding the
limits of federal due process, not the contradictory decisions of the Colorado Supreme Court.").

99. Newsone, 722 F.3d at 1280-81.
100. See Reynolds, 2014 WL 5262174, at *3 ("Here, as in Newsome, the defendant attorneys did
not reach out to forum residents to solicit business; rather, the LLCs came to H & L.").
101. See Hutton & Hutton, 2015 WL 1470515, at *7 ("Here, the parties contemplated a
"continuing relationship" as they jointly-represented Avandia clients through settlement or other
resolution of their lawsuits, which lasted from late spring or early summer 2009 through the
settlement of the cases in April 2012. By reaching into Kansas to create a continuing relationship
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The Newsome court adopted its restrictive view of specific jurisdiction
approximately six months before the Supreme Court limited the
application of general jurisdiction in Daimler.1 0 2 Although the cases deal
with different facets of the personal jurisdiction analysis, their combination
substantially increases the difficulty for legal malpractice plaintiffs suing
national law firms. As noted above, in the past, there would have been no
question that national law firms could be subject to general jurisdiction in
any of the states where their attorneys regularly practiced.1 os Now,
however, general jurisdiction has been narrowed-a plaintiff wishing to
proceed against a law firm outside the firm's home state must rely on
specific jurisdiction. But just as Daimler pushes more cases into the
specific jurisdiction framework, Newsome suggests courts should be
reluctant to exercise specific jurisdiction. This means large law firms, that
a mere two years ago might not have even challenged jurisdiction, could
now be effectively immune from suit in the client's home forum when the
firms' representation related to out-of-state matters.
Such immunity from suit in the client's home jurisdiction played out in
just this manner in a recent Nevada Supreme Court case. A Nevada
plaintiff sued the then-Texas-based law firm of Fulbright & JaworskilO 4
for breach of fiduciary duty arising from a failed Texas real estate deal.' 0 5
When the plaintiff filed suit in Nevada in 2012, the Supreme Court had
not yet decided Daimler. Under the then-prevailing "continuous and
systematic" test, the trial court concluded it could exercise general
jurisdiction over Fulbright & Jaworksi-the firm had litigated regularly in
Nevada courts, and one partner even served as "a paid lobbyist for two
Nevada legislative sessions."'
After Daimler was decided, however,
with plaintiff, G & K purposefully availed itself of the opportunity to conduct business in Kansas.").

102. Newsome was decided in July 2013. Newsome, 722 F.3d at 1257.
103. See supra Part III.A.
104. Fulbright & Jaworski has subsequently changed its firm name to Norton Rose Fulbright
US LLP and has become part of a larger legal entity organized as a Swiss verein. NORTON ROSE
FULBRIGHT, http://www.nortonrosefulbright.com/us (last visited Jan. 7, 2016). The increase in law
firms choosing to operate within the verein structure gives rise to other potential personal jurisdiction
issues, including the possibility of jurisdiction founded on the theory of imputed contacts or alter
ego. See Douglas R. Richmond & Matthew K. Corbin, ProfessionalResponsibility and Liabili_ Aspects of

Verins, the Swirs Army Kmfe of Global Law Firm Combinations, 88 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 917, 958 (2014)
(explaining that personal jurisdiction
Supreme Court has not ruled on the
Regirtraion Statutes, GeneralJurisdition,
(2015) (noting that in Daimler, "[tihe
contacts are imputable to a parent'.

may be found through a firm's alter ego).

Thus far, the

limits of such jurisdictional bases. See Tanya J. Monestier,
and the Fallagy of Consent, 36 CARDOZO L. REv. 1343, 1356
Court sidestepped the thorny issue of when a subsidiary's

105. Fulbright & Jaworski v. Eighth Judicial Dist. Court, 342 P.3d 997, 1000 (Nev. 2015).
106. Answer to Fulbright & Jaworski LLP and Jane Macon's Petition for Writ of Prohibition at
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Fulbright sought interlocutory relief in the Nevada Supreme Court,
arguing that general jurisdiction was improper under the at-home
standard.' 0 7 The Nevada Supreme Court agreed.' 0 8
Fulbright further relied on Newsome to argue that specific jurisdiction
was also improper, since the representation had been limited to a Texas
real estate development project.' 09 The court again agreed, concluding
the law firm "did not actively seek out" the client's business, but was
instead approached by a client representative." 0 Although the firm did
undertake some Nevada contacts during the course of the
representation-including the provision of legal advice within the state of
Nevada-the court concluded that these contacts were insufficiently
related to the alleged misconduct to support jurisdiction."' Thus, the
court concluded that neither specific nor general jurisdiction was
If the plaintiffs wished to purse their lawsuit, they would
appropriate.'
have to do so in Texas.
Interestingly, the Fulbrzgbt case was almost the geographical mirror
image of Cartlidge v. Hernande,"a one of the "minority view" cases
referred to by the Newsome court and decided a decade earlier. In Cartlidge,
a Texas client filed a legal malpractice claim against a Nevada attorney
arising out of a lawsuit filed in Nevada."' The district judge" 5 denied
the defendant's special appearance."' On appeal, the appellate court
agreed jurisdiction was proper."' It pointed to the repeated purposeful
contacts the lawyers had maintained with their clients in Texas and noted
that the Supreme Court had validated resting specific jurisdiction on the
creation of "continuing relationships and obligations with citizens of
(No.
1, Fulbright, 342 P.3d 997
caseView.do?csIID=33314.
107. Fulbgbt, 342 P.3d at 1001-02.
108. Id at 1005-06.
109. Id. at 1003-04.
110. Id. at 1004.

65122),

http://caseinfo.nvsupremecourt.us/public/

111. See id. at 1004-05 ("Here, although the district court concluded that Macon provided 'legal
advice' to Verano's investors at the two presentations, the record contains no indication of what that
legal advice was, much less how Verano's causes of action against petitioners arose from that legal
advice.").

112. Id. at 1005.
113. Cartlidge v. Hernandez, 9 S.W.3d 341 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no pet.).
114. Id. at 344.
115. The Honorable John P. Devine was elected to the Supreme Court of Texas in 2012.

116. Cartdge, 9 S.W.3d at 345.
117. See id. at 350 ("[Wle hold there is factually sufficient evidence to support the trial court's
ruling that the assertion of personal jurisdiction over Cardidge for the alleged legal malpractice does
not offend due process.").

2016]

PersonalJurisdictionin Legal MapraciceLitgation

23

another State" in Buger King. '8
Because the Texas court found minimum contacts had been established,
it looked to the fairness factors.' 1 ' In doing so, the court considered an
interest the Newsome and Fulbrzght courts had not examined: the state's
interest in regulating the provision of legal services to its citizens. 1 20 The
court emphasized that "[t]he importance of the legal profession in our
system of government and, therefore, the importance of maintaining
12 1
integrity within the profession, constitutes a legitimate state interest."
The facts of Cartlidge demonstrate how the client-protection interest can be
undermined by a restrictive personal jurisdiction doctrine. 12 2 While it is
true the Cartlidge attorneys focused their work only in Nevada, the
geographical restriction itself was alleged to be part of the attorneys'
negligence. 1 2 3 The Nevada court had dismissed the underlying lawsuit for
lack of jurisdiction, and the plaintiffs alleged that their Nevada lawyers
were negligent in allowing the claim to lapse by failing to either refile the
claim in Texas or associate with an attorney who could do so.' 2 4
Although Cartlidge was one of the "minority" opinions disfavored by the
Newsome court, its analysis appears to better protect the state's interest in
regulating the provision of legal services. A personal jurisdiction analysis
that examines only where the attorneys perform their legal work-and
thus ignores whether that geographical restriction was itself a reasonable
limitation-leaves a gap between the state's regulatory power and its
adjudicative authority.

IV.

INTEGRATING REGULATORY POWER AND CLIENT INTERESTS

The challenge for courts going forward is to develop an approach to
personal jurisdiction that fits within the framework of the Supreme Court's
recent decisions but still succeeds in protecting state interests in lawyer
regulation and client protection. Although this is a challenge, it is possible
to do-though navigating such a course may require courts to jettison
some of the lower court decisions that predate Daimlerand Walden. Courts

118. Id. at 348 (citing Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462,473 (1985)).
119. Id. at 349 ("Having determined that Cartlidge had sufficient minimum contacts with
Texas, we must now decide whether the trial court's assertion of jurisdiction comports with
'traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.").
120. Id. at 350.
121. Id. at 350 n.10.
122. Id.
123. See id. at 345 (discussing plaintiffs' claim of negligence against attorneys for failing to
"refile the case in Texas ... or refer the case to anyone who could" do so).
124. Id.
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need to revert to first principles to balance the non-resident defendant's
liberty interest in avoiding litigation in an unrelated forum against the
state's interest in ensuring the adequacy of the legal services provided to its
citizens. Doctrinally, these interests can be protected consistently with
Daimlerand Walden by reexamining two parts of the jurisdictional calculus:
the forum relatedness requirement and the foreseeable in-state effects of
the lawyer-client relationship.
A.

Applying a BroaderRelatedness Requirement that Integrates the State Interest in
Client Protection

Now that the Supreme Court has limited general jurisdiction to the
defendant's home forum, more cases will focus on the requirements of
specific jurisdiction. In cases where the defendant's in-forum contacts are
truly continuous and systematic-as, for example, the situation where a
law firm maintains a regional office-courts will sharpen their focus on
The other prongs of specific
the question of forum relatedness.
jurisdiction, after all, would be easily met in such a case: the purposeful
availment standard can easily be met by the ongoing work in the forum,
and the defendant's burden in litigating in a state in which the defendant
has such regular contacts is likely to be minimal. Thus, the analysis will
turn on whether the plaintiffs alleged injuries "arise [from] or relate to"
the defendant's in-forum contacts. 12 5
Courts have long disagreed about what level of connection is needed to
meet the "arise from or relate to" test.' 2 6 Recent Supreme Court
125. The Burger King Court explained:
Where a forum seeks to assert specific jurisdiction over an out-of-state defendant who has
not consented to suit there, this "fair warning" requirement is satisfied if the defendant has
"purposefully directed" his activities at residents of the forum, and the litigation results from
alleged injuries that "arise out of or relate to" those activities.

Burger King v. Rudzewicz, 471 U.S. 462, 472 (1985) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted) (first
quoting Keeton v. Hustler Magazine, Inc., 465 U.S. 770, 774 (1984); and then quoting Helicopteros

Nacionales de Colom., SA v. Hall, 466 U.S. 408, 421 n.1 (1984)).

&

126. See Carol Andrews, Another Look at General PersonalJurisdiction, 47 WAKE FOREST L.
REv. 999, 1026-47 (2012) (noting several competing standards and the ambiguity of using both
"arise" and "relate to" when describing a lack of connection that prompts jurisdiction analysis);
Charles W. "Rocky" Rhodes, The PredictabilityPrinciplein PersonalJurisdictionDoctrine:A Case Study
on the Effects of a "Generally" Too Broad, but "Sperfically"Too Narrow Approach to Minimum Contacts,
57 BAYLOR L. REv. 135, 204-05 (2005) (arguing lower courts do not comport with Supreme Court
precedent due to their own interpretations of what "arise from" actually means); Rhodes
Robertson, supra note 11, at 230-31 (acknowledging a broader standard, although some courts have
declined to disavow the traditional formulations). Suffolk University Law School Professor Linda
Sandstrom Simard suggests:
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precedent has declined to apply a narrow definition, saying only that there
must be "an 'affiliatio[n] between the forum and the underlying
controversy."" 2 7 Lower courts have referred to the connectedness
requirement as the "least developed prong" of specific jurisdiction.' 2 8
When general jurisdiction played a larger role, there was less of a need
to develop a doctrinal analysis of the connectedness requirement, and
when it did apply, courts could afford to apply it strictly.'"' After all, if
the defendant had continuous and systematic contacts, there was no need
to even consider forum connectedness.'
If the defendant had only
sporadic and attenuated contacts, it was reasonable to require a substantial
connection between those contacts and the relevant cause of action.' 3
It was, therefore, no surprise that courts applied different tests, and
such tests were relatively strict. Because the connectedness analysis came
into play only when the defendant's forum contacts were irregular and
limited, courts were reluctant to apply the connectedness requirement in a
way that would expand jurisdiction.' 32 Instead, scholars and courts
sought to apply the connectedness requirement narrowly. One leading
scholar suggested that courts should examine the "substantive relevance"
of such contacts, asking whether the facts of those contacts were relevant
to prove the elements of the plaintiffs cause of action.' 3 3
Courts
imported standards from tort law, applying a "but for" or "proximate
cause" analysis that examined whether the cause of action would have
existed without the defendant's in-forum contacts.
Since the Supreme Court adopted the minimum contacts doctrine over fifty years ago, the
Court has never fully elaborated on the standard that should be applied to determine the scope

of specific jurisdiction. Rather, the Court has loosely stated that a cause of action must "arise
out of," "relate to," or be "connected with" the defendant's forum contacts.
Linda Sandstrom Simard, Meeting Expectations: Two Profilesfor Specific jurisdiction, 38 IND. L. REV.
343, 348 (2005) (quoting Int'l Shoe Co. v. Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 319 (1945)).
127. Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, SA v. Brown, 131 S. Ct. 2846, 2851 (2011) (alteration
in original) (quoting Arthur T. von Mehren & Donald T. Trautman, Jurisdction to Adjudicate: A
Suggested Anaysis, 79 HARV. L. REV. 1121, 1136 (1966)).
128. Ticketmaster-N.Y., Inc. v. Alioto, 26 F.3d 201, 206 (1st Cir. 1994).
129. Rhodes & Robertson, supra note 11, at 230-31.
130. Id. at 235.
131. Id. at 236-37.
132. Id.
133. Lea Brilmayer, How Contacts Count: Due Process Limitations on State Court jurisdiction, 1980
Sup. CT. REV. 77, 82.
134. Nowak v. Tak How Investments, IJd. illustrates this analysis:
[T]he proximate cause standard better comports with the relatedness inquiry because it so easily
correlates to foreseeability, a significant component of the jurisdictional inquiry. A 'but for'
requirement, on the other hand, has in itself no limiting principle; it literally embraces every
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In the last few years, however, courts have increasingly been willing to
reevaluate the connectedness requirement, especially as the Supreme Court
has tightened other aspects of the jurisdiction equation.13 The Supreme
Court of Oregon pointed out that strict adherence to either the
"substantive relevance" approach or the "but for" approach reads the
Supreme Court case law too narrowly; it "focuses exclusively on the 'arise
out of aspect of the Supreme Court's test requiring that an action either
'arise out of or 'relate to' the defendant's contacts with the state."' 3 6 The
Illinois Supreme Court likewise concluded that strict but-for causation was
unnecessary under Supreme Court case law; instead, it evaluated the nature
of the defendant's in-state contacts, and concluded that even though the
in-state contacts did not directly cause the plaintiffs injury, those contacts
were similar enough in nature to qualify as "related" for jurisdictional
purposes.' 3 7 In place of a narrow causation test, both courts seemed to
adopt the standard earlier advocated by Professor Mary Twitchell:
For example, specific jurisdiction might be fair when a defendant's
forum conduct is similar to, but not causally related to, the conduct that
forms the basis for the cause of action. Although the defendant's forumrelated conduct would not be substantively relevant to the claim in this
situation, the functional factors underlying the related-cause-of-action
requirement might still be met.' 3 8
Essentially, the analysis advocated by Twitchell, and adopted in Oregon
and Illinois, interprets the phrase "related to" to reach a higher level of
generality than "arising from." Instead of requiring factual causality, a
dispute can be related to the defendant's forum contacts when those
contacts encompass the same character or type of activity that caused
injury to the forum resident. In this way, the more relaxed standard
incorporates the forum's regulatory interest. After all, when the defendant
engages in the same type of conduct both inside and outside of the forum,
the state has an interest in protecting its citizens from the harm caused by
that conduct. Of course, this is not to say that other forums might not

event that hindsight can logically identify in the causative chain.... That being said, we are
persuaded that strict adherence to a proximate cause standard in all circumstances is
unnecessarily restrictive.

Nowak v. Tak How Inv., Ltd., 94 F.3d 708, 715 (1st Cir. 1996).
135. See Robinson v. Harley-Davidson Motor Co., 316 P.3d 287, 293-94 (Or. 2013) (explaining
the various tests lower courts apply to fill gaps in jurisdictional analyses).

136. Id. at 296-97.
137. Russell v. SNFA, 2013 ILl 13909, ¶ 83.
138. Mary Twitchell, The Myth ofGeneralJurirdiction, 101 IARV. L. REV. 610, 660 (1988).
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have a greater interest-but that question is one that can be addressed
either through the balancing test of the fairness factors or through the
39
discretionary application of the forum non conveniens doctrine.'
If the courts in Fulbrght and Newsome had applied a similar
connectedness requirement, it is likely that both would have upheld the
exercise of jurisdiction. In both cases, it was clear the defendant attorneys
had some contact with the relevant forums-and in the case of Fulbzght,
rather substantial contact. But both cases applied a narrow connectedness
requirement. In Fulbght, the court elided the "purposeful availment"
standard with the connectedness standard, writing that "[p]urposeful
availment requires that '[t]he cause of action .. . arise from the
consequences in the forum state of the defendant's activities."140 The
court left out the "or relates to" prong altogether, finding "the record
contains no indication of what that legal advice was, much less how
Verano's causes of action against petitioners arose from that legal
advice."' 4 1 The Newsome court similarly stated that "the plaintiffs injuries
must arise out of defendant's forum-related activities," while ignoring the
alternative that such activities need only "relate to" forum activities.
The broader conception of the relatedness requirement adopted by
Oregon and Illinois should be applied in legal malpractice actions. First,
that standard more clearly matches the text of the Supreme Court's
opinions and gives meaning to the "relates to" prong of the Court's
formulation. More importantly, however, the broader standard also more
closely aligns jurisdictional expectations with the state's regulatory power.
The American Bar Association's Model Rules of Professional Conduct,
which have largely been enacted by the various states, declare that a lawyer
is "subject to the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction if the lawyer
43
provides or offers to provide any legal services in this jurisdiction."'
The comment to the rule explains that its intent is to protect the state's
citizens-a rationale that applies even if the lawyer is representing the instate client on legal matters arising outside of the client's home state.' 4 4

139. See 4 MALLEN WITH RHODES, supra note 8, § 37:31 ("Even if the contacts are sufficient to
confer jurisdiction, a court may decline to proceed, because of the quality of the contacts or the
interest of another state.").

Fulbright & Jaworski v. Eighth judicial Dist. Court, 342 P.3d 997,1005 (Nev. 2015).
Id.
Newsome v. Gallacher, 722 F.3d 1257, 1281 (10th Cit. 2013) (citing Dudnikov v. Chalk
Fine Arts, Inc., 514 F.3d 1063, 1071 (10th Cir. 2008)).

&

140.
141.
142.
Vermilion

143. MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 8.5 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2013).
144. See id. r. 8.5 cmt. 1 ("Extension of the disciplinary authority of this jurisdiction to other
lawyers who provide or offer to provide legal services in this jurisdiction is for the protection of the
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The constitutional authority of courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over
out-of-state attorneys should be at least as broad as courts' power to
regulate the legal services provided to their citizens. 14 5
B.

Consideringthe ForeseeableIn-State Efects of the Iauyer-ClientRelationshtj

In addition to applying a broader connectedness test, courts should also
examine the foreseeable in-state effects of the lawyer-client relationship.
Walden's restrictive application of effects-test jurisdiction should not be
read to foreclose effects-based jurisdiction in legal malpractice cases when
an attorney represented a client in the target forum.
The key jurisdictional difference between Walden and interstate legal
malpractice cases is the role of the state regulatory interest in protecting instate clients. Professor Allan Erbsen has convincingly argued "[s]tate
regulatory interests are relevant under modern personal jurisdiction
doctrine, as they should be." 1 4 6 He situates effects-test jurisdiction within
the larger federal structure, suggesting that it helps to ensure the fair
allocation of regulatory power between sovereign entities and facilitates the
protection of local citizens. 1 4 7 Other scholars have also argued that the
personal jurisdiction analysis should include attention to the state's
legislative and regulatory power. 14 8
Including the state regulatory interest in the analysis of effects-based
jurisdiction suggests the following standard: when the lawyer's
representation of a client will foreseeably cause in-state effects, those
effects should count as relevant forum contacts that establish purposeful
citizens of this jurisdiction").

145. See Douglas R. Richmond, Why Legal Ethics Rules Are Relevant to Lanyer Liabiity, 38 ST.
MARY'S L.J. 929, 961 (2007) ("[E]thics rules establish only minimum standards of conduct and the
process by which they are enacted makes any standard derived from them reliable.").
146. Erbsen, supra note 67, at 440.
147. Id. at 389. ("Granting or denying jurisdiction can support or undermine regulatory
interests by allocating power between states, imposes burdens on the parties that can impede access
to justice, and alters risk assessments that shape both socially desirable and socially destructive
behavior.').
148. See Jeffrey M. Schmitt, Rethinking the State Sovereignty Interest in Personaljurisdiction,66 CASE
W. RES. L. REV. (forthcoming 2016) (manuscript at 3) (on file with the St. May's Law journal)
(concluding that "as a matter of state sovereignty, a state court may exercise jurisdiction only over a
defendant that engaged in conduct that significantly implicated interests within the sphere of the
state's sovereign power, i.e., the health, safety, and general welfare of its people"); see also Stewart E.

Sterk, PersonalJurisdictionand Choice of Law, 98 IOWA L. REV. 1163, 1206 (2013) (explaining that when
personal jurisdiction protects sovereignty interests, "the concern is that the result achieved in the
forum will upset the ability of another jurisdiction to regulate local activity," and when it protects
liberty interests, "the liberty interest is the ability to plan local activities in reliance on the regulatory
scheme in effect in one's home state").
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availment.
In analyzing whether the attorney made a purposeful
connection with the state-and not merely with an individual who
happened to reside in that state-the court should consider whether the
representation reasonably required the attorney to be aware of the legal
landscape of the client's home forum.
In most cases, the analysis will tilt in favor of allowing jurisdiction.
Unlike the deprivation of funds in Walden, which could have had an effect
anywhere the plaintiff went (and therefore failed to establish a purposeful
connection with the plaintiffs home forum),' 4 9 legal practice is still
inextricably tied to state oversight.' 5 0 Even when an attorney agrees to
represent a client in an out-of-state matter, competent representation may
still require the attorney to protect the client's interest in his or her home
forum-thus, for example, an attorney's unsuccessful attempt to file suit in
Nevada on behalf of a Texas client, along with a failure to protect the
client's interest by then letting the claim lapse instead of refiling the case in
The
Texas, will foreseeably cause harm in the client's home state.1 5
client's home state of Texas is not a mere "fortuity" that the attorney may
remain ignorant of, or ignore; a competent attorney must remain aware of
state law that binds the client and thus has ramifications for legal matters
that proceed elsewhere. Thus, for example, state law may impose a
fiduciary duty in the client's business dealings, and state law may give rise
to tax liability on an out-of-state transaction or may recognize a lien on the
client's property. Accepting the representation of an out-of-state client
requires, at a minimum, that the attorney keep a watchful eye out to spot
state-law issues that may affect the representation.' 5 2
In other contexts, reliance on effects-based jurisdiction can be
problematic because it effectively allows a state to regulate extraterritorial
conduct. In tort cases arising from speech acts-such as libel, slander, or
other related actions-such extraterritorial regulation can run afoul of
149. Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115, 1125 (2014).
150. See Larry E. Ribstein, Lauyers As Lawmakers: A Theoy of Lanyer LIcensing, 69 Mo. L. REV.
299, 305-06 (2004) ("The state's power to withdraw a professional license enforces conduct
regulation by causing forfeiture of the professional's substantial investment in the training and other
costs necessary to obtain the license.").

151. Cartlidge v. Hernandez, 9 S.W.3d 341, 344-45 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1999, no
pet.); see supra Part III.B (recommending relevant forum contacts should be established if an in-state
contact causes a foreseeable in-state effect).
152. See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT r. 1.1 (AM. BAR Ass'N 2013) ("A lawyer shall
Competent representation requires the legal
provide competent representation to a client.
knowledge, skill, thoroughness and preparation reasonably necessary for the representation."); id.
r. 1.1 cmts. 1-8 (AM. BAR ASS'N 2013) (explaining a lawyer may become competent through study or
may associate with another attorney with the required expertise if the client so permits).
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constitutional free speech guarantees.1'
This result can be especially
problematic in the jurisdictional context, because the jurisdictional analysis
is done before any resolution on the merits of the claim has happened. 5 4
While a state may have a valid interest in prohibiting out-of-state
defamation that causes in-state harm to one of its citizens, it does not have
a regulatory interest in regulating extraterritorial non-defamatory protected
speech.1 5 5 Any such attempt to do so would encroach on the rights of
the citizens of other states. 5 6
In the context of legal practice, however, courts have long experience in
working out the boundaries of extraterritorial regulation. First, the state's
power to regulate legal practice is much broader than its general power to
regulate speech. In the speech context, regulatory power depends upon a
finding that the words were defamatory or otherwise non-protected. The
power to regulate the provision of legal advice is much broader, however,
and it does not depend on a finding of wrongfulness. Additionally, when
more than one state has a regulatory interest in the lawyer's provision of
legal services, choice-of-law considerations determine which interests will
be paramount.1 5 7 There is no inherent problem, however, with allowing
more than one state to exercise regulatory power when the legal practice
affects more than one jurisdiction.' 5 8
V.

CONCLUSION

Lawyers are increasingly engaging in multi-jurisdictional practice. 159 As
a result, courts are facing more and more legal malpractice cases in which
clients seek to sue nonresident attorneys in the plaintiffs home forum.
Such cases have presented a challenge for judges, who have long been
faced with a murky and evolving personal jurisdiction doctrine. Over the

153. Cassandra Burke Robertson, The Inextricable Merits Problem in Persona/Jurisdiction,45 U.C.
DAVIS L. REV. 1301, 1348 (2012) ("By their nature, effects-test cases often involve potentially
wrongful speech.').
154. Id. at 1330-32 (explaining the procedure for proving jurisdictional facts).
155. Id. at 1341 (noting the limits of the state's regulatory power).

156. Allan Erbsen, Horizyntal Federaism,93 MINN. L. REV. 493, 564 (2008) ("[A]ny assertion in
the form 'State X lacks power to regulate activity Y' can be restated as 'actors engaging in activity Y
have a right not [to] be regulated by state X.").
157. See MODEL RULES r. 8.5(b) (providing a choice-of-law analysis that generally favors the
forum where "the predominant effect of the conduct" occurred).
158. See id. r. 8.5(a) ("A lawyer may be subject to the disciplinary authority of both this
jurisdiction and another jurisdiction for the same conduct.").

159. See John Leubsdorf, Iegal Ethics Falls Apart, 57 BUFF. L. REV. 959, 1047 (2009)
("Ultimately, the growth of multistate and multinational practice should tend to make professional
standards more uniform.").
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years, courts have applied the personal jurisdiction doctrine inconsistently,
reaching varying results even in similar factual scenarios.'1 6 The challenge
grew even greater after the Supreme Court decided two new cases that
reshaped the foundation of the personal jurisdiction analysis. 1 6
However, the Supreme Court's new jurisprudence also presents an
opportunity for courts to adopt a more cohesive analysis of personal
jurisdiction in legal malpractice cases. The Supreme Court has left room
for courts to consider the state's interest in regulating legal practice and
protecting state citizens as part of its personal jurisdiction analysis. To
ensure that such interests are not neglected, courts should focus on two
aspects of the specific jurisdiction analysis. First, they should permit a
broader view of "connectedness" in specific jurisdiction cases, upholding
jurisdiction when the defendant's forum conduct is similar to the conduct
at issue in the suit-even if there is not a clear causal relationship.' 6 2
Second, courts should consider the foreseeable in-state effects of the
attorney's out-of-state conduct.' 6 3 If competent representation would
give rise to foreseeable in-state issues and consequences, the attorney has
engaged in purposeful availment of forum benefits by accepting the
engagement. Both of these recommendations are consistent with existing
Supreme Court precedent, and both would promote a more consistent
approach to personal jurisdiction while protecting client interests.

160.
161.
162.
163.

See supra Part II.
Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746 (2014); Walden v. Fiore, 134 S. Ct. 1115 (2014).
See supra Part I.A.
See supra Part IV.B.

